

**GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA  
BOARD OF MEDICINE**

**IN RE:**

**ROBERT HARDI, M.D.**

**License No.: MD14559**

**Respondent**

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**ORDER**

This matter comes before the District of Columbia Board of Medicine (Board) on Respondent Robert Hardi, M.D.’s affidavit surrendering his licensed to practice medicine in the District of Columbia pursuant to D.C. Code § 3-1207.17(a). He submitted his affidavit through counsel on October 31, 2025.

In accordance with D.C. Code § 3-1205.17(b), upon receipt of the affidavit, the Board shall enter an order “revoking, suspending or accepting the surrender of the license . . .” In considering the affidavit at its meeting on January 28, 2026, the Board made the following findings:

1. Respondent’s license in the District was originally issued on May 18, 1984.
2. Respondent’s license was summarily suspended in the District on March 20, 2019, based on a summary suspension from the Maryland State Board of Physicians (Maryland Board) for having a sexual relationship with a patient. Following the suspension and satisfactory compliance with the terms of a probation order, Respondent’s license was returned to good standing on June 24, 2020.
3. On February 18, 2025, the Maryland Board filed charges under the Maryland Medical Practice Act alleging that Respondent had another romantic/sexual relationship with an employee from about October 2017 through December 2021, to whom he also provided medical treatment. The charges also alleged that the controlled substances prescribed by Respondent to this individual were not medically justified.

4. On October 18, 2025, Respondent submitted to the Maryland Board a Permanent Surrender of License to Practice (Letter of Surrender) in the state of Maryland. The Letter of Surrender included an acknowledgment that:

[O]n or about April 24, 2024, the [Maryland] Board initiated an investigation of me after receiving information that I perjured myself by denying my romantic and sexual relationship with a former patient/employee during a prior Board investigation that resulted in the Final Decision and Order dated March 23, 2020. The Board's investigation found that while I was the owner of a health care practice, I engaged in an inappropriate relationship with a patient/employee, including maintaining a romantic and sexual relationship while also functioning as her employer, treating physician, and prescriber. The investigation further concluded that I made false statements to the Board in an under-oath interview in 2018, and during my testimony at an evidentiary hearing in 2019, in which I denied having a sexual relationship with the patient/employee.

5. On October 31, 2025, Respondent submitted an affidavit surrendering his license to practice medicine in the District of Columbia.

Respondent committed a serious violation for having a sexual relationship with a patient for which he was significantly disciplined in 2020. At the same time and continuing past his probationary period, he had a continuing sexual relationship with a person to whom he was providing medical treatment, committing the same or similar violations up until the person's death.

In its consideration of what final action to take, the Board acknowledges Respondent's initiative in surrendering his license. However his repetitive sexual misconduct is egregious and constitutes a real and potential ongoing threat to the safety of the public.

Accordingly, it is hereby

**ORDERED** that the medical license of Robert Hardi, M.D., shall be and is hereby **REVOKED**.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BOARD OF MEDICINE

February 12, 2026

Date



By: Andrea Anderson, MD, MEd, FAAFP  
Chairperson

### **Judicial Review of Final Actions by a Board**

Pursuant to D.C. Official Code § 3-1205.20:

Any person aggrieved by a final decision of a board or the Mayor may appeal the decision to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals pursuant to D.C. Official Code § 2-510.

NOTE: Any appeal noted to the Court of Appeals must be filed within 30 days of the final decision of the Board. See D.C. Court of Appeals Rule 15(a)(2).

### **D.C. Official Code, §2-510 provides:**

(a) Any person suffering a legal wrong, or adversely affected or aggrieved, by an order or decision of the Mayor or an agency in a contested case, is entitled to a judicial review thereof in accordance with this subchapter upon filing in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals a written petition for review. If the jurisdiction of the Mayor or an agency is challenged at any time in any proceeding and the Mayor or the agency, as the case may be, takes jurisdiction, the person challenging jurisdiction shall be entitled to an immediate judicial review of that action, unless the Court shall otherwise hold. The reviewing Court may by rule prescribe the forms and contents of the petition and, subject to this subchapter, regulate generally all matters relating to proceedings on such appeals. A petition for review shall be filed in such Court within such time as such Court may by rule prescribe and a copy of such petition shall forthwith be served by mail by the clerk of the Court upon the Mayor or upon the agency, as the case may be. Within such time as may be fixed by rule of the Court, the Mayor or such agency shall certify and file in the Court the exclusive record for decision and any supplementary proceedings, and the clerk of the Court shall immediately notify the petitioner of the filing thereof. Upon the filing of a petition for review, the Court shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding, and shall have power to affirm, modify, or set aside the order or decision complained of, in whole or in part, and, if need be, to remand the case for further proceedings, as justice may require. Filing of a petition for review shall not in itself stay enforcement of the order or decision of the Mayor or the agency, as the case may be. The Mayor or the agency may grant, or the reviewing Court may order, a stay upon appropriate terms. The Court shall hear and determine all appeals upon the exclusive record for decision before the Mayor or the agency. The review of all administrative orders and decisions by the Court shall be limited to such issues of law or fact as are subject to review on appeal under applicable statutory law, other than this subchapter. In all other cases the review by the Court of administrative orders and decisions shall be in accordance with the rules of law which define the scope and limitations of review of administrative proceedings. Such rules shall include, but not be limited to, the power of the Court:

- (1) Subject to subsections (c) and (d) of this section and so far as necessary to decision and where presented, to decide all relevant questions of law, to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and to determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of any action;
- (2) To compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and
- (3) To hold unlawful and set aside any action or findings and conclusions found to be:
  - (A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
  - (B) Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;

(C) In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations or short of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations or short of statutory rights;

(D) Without observance of procedure required by law, including any applicable procedure provided by this subchapter; or

(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in the record of the proceedings before the Court.

(b) In reviewing administrative orders and decisions, the Court shall review such portions of the exclusive record as may be designated by any party. The Court may invoke the rule of prejudicial error.

(c) In reviewing an order or decision of the Mayor or an agency in any court or administrative proceeding, including but not limited to proceedings under subsection (a) of this section, the reviewing tribunal shall defer to the Mayor's or agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute or regulation it administers; provided, that the interpretation is not plainly wrong, or inconsistent with the statutory or regulatory language or the legislature's intent.

(d) In reviewing a rule adopted by the Mayor or an agency, the reviewing tribunal shall defer to the Mayor's or agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute it administers; provided, that the interpretation is not plainly wrong or inconsistent with the statutory language or the legislature's intent.

Copies to:

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